Tough Love: Do Czech Suppliers Learn from Their Relationships with Multinationals? by Beata S. Javorcik & Mariana Spatareanu
TOUGH LOVE: 












RUTGERS UNIVERSITY, NEWARK WORKING PAPER #2009-004 
 
 
Abstract: Many countries strive to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) hoping that 
knowledge brought by multinationals will spill over to domestic industries and increase 
their productivity. While the empirical studies have cast doubt on the existence of 
horizontal spillovers from FDI in developing countries, several recent papers have 
confirmed the presence of vertical spillovers, which take place through contacts between 
foreign affiliates and their local suppliers.  However, the existing studies rely on industry-
level proxies for vertical spillovers rather than information on actual relationships 
between local companies and multinationals. This study goes one step further by 
employing a unique dataset from the Czech Republic, which allows us to identify local 
firms supplying multinationals operating in the country. The data suggest that suppliers 
are different from other firms. They are larger, have a higher capital-labor ratio, pay 
higher wages and exhibit a higher productivity level. The evidence is suggestive of both 
high productivity firms having a higher probability of supplying multinationals as well as 
suppliers learning from their relationships with multinationals. 
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I. Introduction 
Policy makers in developed and developing countries place attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI) high on their agenda, expecting FDI inflows to bring new 
technologies, know-how and thus contribute to increasing the productivity and the 
competitiveness of domestic industries.  Many economies go beyond the national 
treatment of multinationals (MNCs) by offering foreign companies, through subsidies and 
tax holidays, more favorable conditions than those granted to domestic firms.
1 As the 
economic rationale for this special treatment, they often cite positive externalities 
generated by FDI through productivity spillovers to domestic firms.   
Despite this issue being hugely important to public policy choices, there is little 
conclusive evidence indicating that domestic firms in developing countries benefit from 
foreign presence in their sector (see Haddad and Harrison (1993) study on Morocco, 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) on Venezuela and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on the 
Czech Republic). The picture is more optimistic in the case of vertical spillovers, namely 
those taking place through contacts between multinationals and their local suppliers of 
intermediate inputs, as several existing studies demonstrate that the productivity of 
domestic firms is positively correlated with the presence of multinationals in downstream 
industries.  The evidence on vertical spillovers emerges from a review of the case study 
literature (Moran 2001) and from firm-level econometric analyses performed by Javorcik 
(2004) using Lithuanian data, Javorcik and Spatareanu (2008) focusing on Romania, and 
Blalock and Gertler (2004) employing Indonesian data.
2  However, the existing studies of 
vertical spillovers rely on industry level proxies for linkages between industries and thus 
are unable to pinpoint the exact mechanism through which such spillovers take place. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study testing directly whether firms 
supplying multinational corporations are more productive than non-suppliers.  Moreover, 
this is the only study that makes a distinction between the self-selection issue (i.e., the 
possibility that more productive firms become MNC suppliers) and the learning effect 
(i.e., the productivity benefits accruing to suppliers from their interactions with MNCs).
3   
                                                 
1 For instance, 59 of 108 countries surveyed by the World Bank reported offering some type of FDI 
incentives in 2004 (Harding and Javorcik 2007).  
2 For a survey of the literature see Görg and Greenaway (2004). 
3 A notable exception is a paper by Chung, Mitchell and Yeung (2003) who examined this question in the 
context of U.S. automotive component industry in the 1980s. They found that Japanese FDI into   3
Understanding how firms become MNC suppliers and whether or not they benefit 
from their relationship with multinationals has important policy implications. If local 
suppliers indeed learn from their interactions with foreign affiliates then using policy 
instruments to attract FDI or establishing supplier development programs may be 
justified.  If, on the other hand, what matters is having prospects for more lucrative 
contracts than those available from local customers then a similar outcome could be 
achieved by, for instance, facilitating access to foreign markets through multilateral or 
preferential trade agreements and/or facilitating the flow of information about foreign 
markets and business opportunities available there. 
Examining the question asked by this study poses big data challenges. 
Information on the type of customers supplied by firms (and hence their MNC supplying 
status) is typically not collected by statistical agencies, tax authorities or commercial 
databases. While time-varying information on relationships with MNC customers can be 
obtained through firm-level surveys, such surveys cannot be used to collect long spans of 
historical data on firm balance sheets and profit and loss statements. Therefore, in order 
to conduct our study we combined enterprise survey covering 391 domestic firms 
operating in the Czech Republic in 2003 with historical company account data from a 
commercial database Amadeus. The survey allows us to identify companies making sales 
to multinationals operating in the Czech Republic along with the information about the 
duration of these relationships and details regarding firm management.  Amadeus gives us 
historical panel data on firms’ balance sheets and profit and loss statements for the period 
1993-2000. We are thus able to construct an unbalanced panel data of domestic firms that 
encompasses a plethora of time varying information on firms’ balance sheet variables as 
well as their supplier relationships. 
The Czech Republic is suitable place to study this question for several reasons. 
After starting its transition from central planning to a free market economy, it has 
received large inflows of foreign direct investment. Between 1993 and 2000, total FDI 
inflows it had received reached 21.8 billion dollars or 2,124 dollars per capita. Survey 
                                                                                                                                                   
automotive assembly was associated with overall productivity improvements in the U.S. auto component 
industry.  However, their results also indicated that Japanese assemblers tended to purchase components 
from less productive U.S. suppliers and that the productivity growth of U.S. suppliers affiliated with 
Japanese assemblers was not greater than that of other non-affiliated U.S. suppliers.   4
evidence suggests that MNCs are actively engaged in local sourcing in the Czech 
Republic. They purchase about half of intermediate inputs (in terms of value) from Czech 
suppliers. The virtual absence of FDI before the beginning of transition also means that 
supplying relationships between MNCs and Czech firms are of a relatively new vintage. 
The empirical results indicate that Czech firms supplying multinationals exhibit 
different characteristics from other firms. They tend to have higher sales, be more capital-
intensive, pay higher wages and exhibit higher productivity. While there is evidence of 
more productive firms self-selecting into supplying relationships with multinationals, the 
analysis employing the instrumental variable approach is suggestive of learning from the 
relationships with MNCs.  
This study is structured as follows.  The next section introduces the data sources, 
presents the arguments why we would expect suppliers to perform differently than other 
firms and discusses the summary statistics. Section 3 describes the empirical specification 
and presents the results.  Section 4 concludes. 
 
II. Are MNC Suppliers Special? 
Data sources 
The analysis, presented in this study, is based on the results of an enterprise 
survey commissioned by the Foreign Investment Advisory Services (FIAS), a joint 
facility of the World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, in the Czech 
Republic during the second half of 2003.  The survey was conducted by a professional 
polling company by means of face-to-face interviews taking place at respondents’ 
workplaces.  All respondents were guaranteed full anonymity.  Three hundred ninety-one 
Czech and 119 foreign companies were interviewed.  The focus of the survey was on 
manufacturing firms, i.e. those operating in sectors 15-36 according to the NACE 
classification.  About one-fifth of respondents were located in the capital city of Prague 
while the rest was distributed across all regions of the country. As we are interested in the 
implications of FDI for indigenous producers, our econometric analysis is based only on 
data for the Czech firms. However, we will also present summary statistics on the 
qualitative questions answered by foreign affiliates.   5
The results of the firm survey were supplemented with financial information on 
interviewed firms, which was taken from the Amadeus database compiled by Bureau van 
Dijk.
4 This additional financial information is available for about a third of firms in the 
sample. The balance sheet and profit and loss information covers the period 1993-2000. 
After discarding outliers, we are left with 486 observations for the Czech firms.
5 This 
unbalanced panel encompasses 108 domestic companies, 40 of which are suppliers to 
MNCs operating in the Czech Republic.  
As part of our dataset is based on information from a survey, one may be 
concerned about the response bias.  This, however, does not appear to be serious concern 
as the mean values of firm total assets, fixed assets, value added and sales do not appear 
to be significantly different between the respondent group and firms which declined to be 
interviewed. The two groups differ only with respect to employment–survey respondents 
appear to be larger (see Table 1). 
Companies are classified as MNC suppliers if they report in the survey that they 
make sales to at least one multinational and are able to indicate the year they started 
doing business with MNCs operating in the Czech Republic.  The definition of a supplier 
pertains only to firms making sales to foreign affiliates active in the Czech Republic.  The 
supplier dummy is set to 1 starting in the first year the company supplied an MNC and 
ending in 2000, which is the last year of our sample. The supplier dummy is equal to zero 
in all other cases. As no detailed information on the supplier status is available for 
individual years in between, we assume that companies have been supplying MNCs 
throughout this period.  This is a reasonable assumption as the survey results indicate that 
MNCs are interested in long term relationships with their suppliers. For instance, when 
asked about the shortest and the longest contract accepted, local companies reported on 
average 14 and 31 months, respectively.
6   
                                                 
4 The database includes all firms that either had total assets of more than 20 million Czech Crowns (CZK) 
or a turnover of more than 40 million CZK. 
5 We removed companies with missing employment figures, negative value added and wages and 
observations containing obvious typographical errors. 
6 This assumption is also supported by the findings of Chung et al. (2003) who showed that once U.S. 
suppliers established a relationship with a Japanese auto maker, they typically provided the components for 
the entire model run of four years or more.   6
The distribution of suppliers and non-suppliers across sectors is presented in 
Table 2. 
 
FDI inflows and local sourcing in the Czech Republic 
As illustrated in Chart 1, FDI started to flow to the Czech Republic in the early 
1990s with the flows increasing substantially since the mid-1990s. Thus it comes as no 
surprise that the supplying relationships between Czech firms and foreign MNCs located 
in the country began quite early in the transition process.  About half of the suppliers in 
the sample reported making their first sale to an MNC before 1996.  Starting in 1999, 
however, the growing volume of FDI inflows does not seem to have been accompanied 
by an increase in the number of firms becoming MNC suppliers.  This pattern may be due 
to the following factors.  First, the chart depicts only the number of firms receiving their 
first contract ever from an MNC customer and thus it does not capture the likely situation 
of firms increasing the number of foreign customers by obtaining contracts from MNCs 
newly entering the country.  Second, FDI inflows in the late 1990s and the early 2000s 
were dominated by non-manufacturing sectors (mainly transport, communications, 
financial intermediation, etc.) which tend to source fewer intermediate inputs.  For 
instance, while during 1993-2002 sixty-nine percent of all FDI inflows went into non-
manufacturing, this proportion was equal to 82 percent in 2002. 
While our analysis focuses mainly on local firms, the survey also collected views 
of MNCs active in the Czech Republic, which allows us to shed some light on the extent 
and factors driving their sourcing decisions.
7 The survey results suggest that 
multinationals are actively engaged in local sourcing in the Czech Republic.  Ninety 
percent of interviewed MNCs reported purchasing inputs from at least one Czech 
company.
8 The median MNC in the sample had a sourcing relationship with 10 Czech 
suppliers while an MNC in the top quartile with at least 30.  Czech companies were the 
                                                 
7 The interviewed firms were majority-owned foreign investment enterprises and represented almost all 
manufacturing industries, namely, fabricated metals (19 MNCs); publishing and printing (14); rubber (11); 
machinery (10); apparel (9); electrical machinery (9); food products (8); textiles (7); non-metallic mineral 
products (7); furniture (6); pulp and paper (4); wood products (3); chemicals (3); radio, TV and 
communications equipment (3); leather (2); basic metals (1); medical equipment (1); motor vehicles (1) and 
other transport equipment (1). 
8 Note that the question specifically asked respondents to exclude suppliers of services, such as catering or 
cleaning.   7
most important supplier group, followed by other European suppliers (located in the 
European Union or Eastern Europe) and other MNCs operating in the Czech Republic.  
There also appeared to be a limited amount of sourcing from North America.  Less than 
eight percent of MNCs made their purchases in Russia or the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (see Table 3).  
When asked about the share of inputs purchased from each type of suppliers (in 
terms of value), MNCs indicated sourcing on average 48.3 percent of inputs from Czech 
enterprises, as compared to 33.3 and 12.6 percent from firms in the European 
Union/Eastern Europe and MNCs located in the Czech Republic, respectively (see Chart 
2).  The share of inputs coming from the other regions appears to be negligible.  Since 
average figures do not always give an accurate impression, it is worthwhile to report 
some more statistics.  Fifty-five out of the 114 MNCs, which answered this question, 
reported buying at least half of their inputs from Czech suppliers.  More than a tenth of 
respondents acquired all of their inputs from Czech enterprises.  Around forty percent of 
MNCs expected to purchase more inputs from Czech suppliers in the future.  However, 
the anticipated increase was unlikely to be large and was expected to come from MNCs 
with limited local sourcing at present.
9  
As for the composition of inputs sourced by MNCs, almost half of all inputs 
purchased were parts and components or final products (on average 32.4 and 15.6 
percent, respectively). Raw materials constituted 36 percent and packaging 14 percent.   
The MNC decision to choose one type of supplier over another was driven by 
several factors. For example, the top reasons reported for cooperating with Czech 
suppliers included: low prices (71%), geographic proximity which allowed for a better 
relationship with a supplier (64%), savings on transport costs (56%) and savings on 
import duties (44%). On the other hand, sourcing from foreign firms located in the Czech 
Republic was primarily driven by the fact that these firms were global suppliers of the 
MNCs (45%), offered more competitive prices (45%), higher quality products (29%) or 
products not available from Czech firms (29%). As before, savings on transport costs 
                                                 
9 Note that these figures are similar to those collected in other surveys.  For instance, the Opinion Window 
survey commissioned by CzechInvest in 2002 found that MNCs in the Czech Republic sourced on average 
32.2 percent of their inputs locally in 2000 and 34.7 percent in 2001.  This share was expected to increase 
to 35.8 percent in 2002.  Similarly, CzechInvest reported that 57 percent of MNCs indicated their ability to 
increase local content (CzechInvest Factsheet No. 3, January 2002).   8
(34%) and benefits of proximity (30%) mattered as well. Finally, importing inputs from 
abroad was primarily driven by: using company’s global suppliers (46%), implementing 
the decision of the parent company (37%), unavailability of particular products from 
Czech firms (36%) or desire to purchase higher quality inputs (30%).   
 
Should being an MNC supplier matter? 
There are several reasons why we would expect that MNC suppliers are different 
from other firms.  On the one hand, we might expect that as a result of their contacts with 
MNCs local suppliers improve their performance. By doing business with multinationals 
local firms expose themselves to greater competition as they compete not only with other 
local firms but also with potential suppliers from abroad and are under pressure to 
improve their performance in order to retain their supplier status.  Further, as case studies 
suggest (Moran 2001), they may also benefit from direct assistance and knowledge 
transfer from their multinational customers. Such knowledge transfer would be consistent 
with the results of the empirical studies on inter-industry spillovers (Javorcik 2004; 
Javorcik and Spatareanu 2008; Blalock and Gertler 2008).   
On the other hand, it is plausible that good firms self-select into being MNC 
suppliers.  This hypothesis has been tested empirically and confirmed in the context of 
exporters (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998).  In a general 
equilibrium model with productivity heterogeneity across firms, Melitz (2003) 
demonstrated that if there are sunk costs associated with export market entry, firms with 
higher ex ante productivity self-select into exporting, whilst those with lower productivity 
produce only for the domestic market. Given the fact that MNC customers tend to have 
higher requirements in terms of quality, technological sophistication and on-time delivery 
of the product, especially when compared to domestic buyers in developing and transition 
economies, becoming an MNC supplier is likely to be associated with some fixed cost on 
the part of local firms.
10  
 
                                                 
10 The anecdotal evidence collected by the author during conversations with managers of local firms in the 
Czech Republic suggests that this is indeed the case.  Before becoming MNC suppliers many firms had to 
go through lengthy technical audits performed by their potential customers and were often required to 
obtain quality certifications, such as ISO 9000.   9
Self-selection or learning? 
Before we examine this question in a formal manner, it may be interesting to 
present some tabulations from the survey which suggest that both possibilities are 
plausible.  First, we focus on the arguments in favor of good firms self-selecting into 
becoming MNC suppliers.  
The key factor that allows Czech companies to make sales to MNCs is having a 
product of a suitable quality.  This view is supported by the fact that eighty percent of 
survey respondents sell the same product to both MNC and local customers, and only five 
percent of respondents sell an improved version of the product to MNCs and its basic 
version to local customers. Only twenty-one percent of firms reported developing the 
product specifically for the MNC customer and in only 5.5 percent of cases the foreign 
customer helped in the development process.  For a quarter of all firms the product was 
developed in house, and only in four percent of companies it is based on technology 
licensed from abroad.   
While Czech suppliers appear to be engaged in product upgrading, a vast majority 
of such activities is based on their own efforts.  More than a quarter of MNCs reported 
that the complexity and/or quality of products bought from Czech suppliers increased 
during the previous two years.  In more than half of the cases, this change was due to 
suppliers making improvements independently of the MNCs.  In the remaining cases, the 
improvement was a result of the foreign customer introducing higher requirements. Only 
in a handful of cases (15%), the MNC respondents indicated that the change was a direct 
result of the assistance provided to the supplier. 
Having a suitable product is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
becoming an MNC supplier. Many multinationals go through thorough technical audits 
and/or require their prospective suppliers to obtain quality certification, such as for 
instance ISO 9000. As a further evidence of self-selection may serve the fact that 17 
percent of Czech companies surveyed reported obtaining ISO certification in order to 
become MNC suppliers. These firms constituted 40 percent of all companies reporting 
having an ISO certification. 
The survey results also suggest that Czech companies may be learning from their 
contacts with MNCs.  For instance, 25 out of 171 Czech suppliers interviewed reported   10
receiving various forms of assistance from their multinational customers.  Given the fact 
that credit constraints faced by Czech companies were mentioned by MNCs as one of the 
factors preventing them from sourcing more inputs locally, it is not surprising that 
advance payment and financing topped the list of assistance received (see Table 4).  It 
was closely followed by leasing of machinery and employee training.  Further, Czech 
suppliers reported receiving assistance with quality control, business strategy, purchasing 
inputs and production technology. While there is some evidence of technology transfer 
taking place (through leasing of machinery, direct assistance with production technology 
or technology licensing), the picture is consistent with the earlier observation that most 
Czech companies acquire their production technology on their own. Thus the knowledge 
transfer is more likely to pertain to general business practices rather than specific 
technologies. It takes the form of employee training, help with quality control, 
organization of production lines or inventory management.
11 Providing employee training 
seems to take place quite frequently, as one-fifth of suppliers stated that their staff was 
invited for training to the premises of the multinational customer.  While fees are charged 
for some forms of support, the majority of it is free (see Table 4).   
The high requirements imposed on suppliers by MNCs and fiercer competition 
such firms face while doing business with multinationals constitute another reason why 
we would expect local suppliers to perform better than other Czech firms. For instance, 
about a third of suppliers reported that MNC customers required the share of defective 
products delivered to decline over time. Similarly, in 39 percent of cases, price cuts were 
mandated to take place over time. Moreover, as indicated above, in order to retain their 
supplier status some companies needed to upgrade their products. 
In summary, the evidence collected through the survey suggests that better 
performing firms become MNC suppliers and that some knowledge transfer is taking 
place from MNCs to their local suppliers. 
 
Are MNC suppliers different? 
                                                 
11 For instance, after a Czech producer of aluminum alloy castings for the automotive industry signed its 
first contract with an MNC, the MNC staff visited the Czech firm’s premises for two days each month over 
an extended period to assist with improving the quality control system. Subsequently, the Czech firm 
applied these improvements to its other production lines (not serving this particular customer) and reduced 
the proportion of defective items produced (Javorcik 2004).   11
What do the hard figures tell us about characteristics of suppliers relative to other 
firms?  In Table 5, we present summary statistics for the two groups of firms separately. 
We find that suppliers tend to have on average higher sales, fixed assets, investment and 
total factor productivity (TFP) than non-suppliers. However, the differences between the 
two groups do not appear to be very large, especially with respect to the last variable. 
Suppliers are more likely to have an ISO certification or a manager with foreign work 
experience.  
Since these statistics may be influenced by the sectoral composition of firms 
within the two groups, we follow Bernard and Jensen and calculate supplier premium by 
regressing each of these variables on industry and year fixed effects.  We also repeat the 
exercise controlling for firm size measured by employment. The results presented in 
Table 6 indicate that MNC suppliers tend to be 13 percent larger in terms of employment 
and 18 percent in terms of sales value but they do not experience a faster sales growth. 
Further, they tend to have higher TFP levels (14 percent premium) and value added per 
worker (23 percent premium).  They also appear to be more capital-intensive (17 percent) 
and pay higher wages (12 percent). Controlling for firm size does not change these 
conclusions.  
 
III. Econometric analysis 
Predicting the supplier status 
Having established the case for self-selection and learning, we now turn to the 
econometric analysis. We begin by examining the determinants of the supplying status 
using a probit model. Let Supplierit be a dummy variable that takes the value of one if 
firm i supplies one or more MNCs at time t, and zero otherwise. More specifically, this 
variable equals one for all years after (and including) the year in which a firm started 
making sales to multinationals. We assume that a firm supplies MNCs if and only if a 
latent variable, Supplierit* is positive.  The latent variable depends on a number of firm 
characteristics and its industry affiliation. 
 
Supplierit = 1 if Supplierit* > 0 
Supplierit = 0 otherwise    12
where 
Supplierit* = α + β1 ln TFP it-1 + β2 ln Size it-1 + β3 Cash ratio it-1 + β4 Exporter it-1 + νt + νj + uit 
 
As the first determinant of the supplying status, we consider a firm’s TFP lagged 
one period, as it is likely that only the best performing firms are able to meet the 
expectations of multinational buyers. The TFP is estimated using the semi-parametric 
estimation procedure suggested by Olley and Pakes (1996), which allows us to take into 
account the possibility that a firm's private knowledge of its productivity (unobserved by 
the econometrician) may affect the input decisions. This method allows for firm-specific 
productivity differences that exhibit idiosyncratic changes over time and thus addresses 
the simultaneity bias between productivity shocks and input choices. The insight of the 
method is that the observable characteristics of the firm, such as investment, can be 
modeled as a monotonic function of the productivity of the firm.  
To obtain TFP we estimate production functions whether output is measured by 
firm’s turnover and production inputs include capital, labor and materials. Turnover is 
expressed in constant units of the local currency deflated using the PPI index for the 
three-digit NACE sectors (defined according to the Classification of Economic Activities 
in the European Community), obtained from the Czech Statistical Office.  The capital 
stock is proxied by the value of fixed assets expressed in constant units of the local 
currency. The value of fixed assets has been deflated using the GDP deflator from the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Labor input is measured using the wage bill 
deflated using the consumer price index from IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
Material inputs are deflated using the weighted average of PPI index for the three-digit 
NACE supplying sectors. Investment was calculated as difference in fixed assets plus 
depreciation. Negative values were set to zero. The Olley-Pakes procedure is performed 
separately for each 2-digit NACE sector using information on all domestic firms listed in 
Amadeus rather than just those covered by the survey.
12  
                                                 
12 In order to be able to express unobserved productivity as a function of investment and capital, the Olley 
and Pakes procedure relies on the observations with nonzero investment. However, as shown by Pavcnik 
(2002), including observations with zero investment does not seem to be problematic in practice. Hence, to 
avoid a reduction in the sample size, we do not discard cases of zero investment.   13
As the second determinant of the supplier status, we include the firm’s size lagged 
one period. It is possible that foreign affiliates prefer doing business with large and well-
established firms or that only large suppliers are able to provide the required volume of 
output. We measure the firm’s size in terms of total assets, deflated using the GDP 
deflator. Both the TFP and the firm size enter in the log form. 
As the survey evidence suggests that MNC suppliers may need to undertake 
costly changes in preparation for doing business with MNCs, firms with more cash at 
hand may be better positioned to do so. To take this possibility in to account we control 
for the ratio of firm’s cash to its current liabilities, which measures the firm’s ability to 
meet its cash obligations and is often used in the short-term liquidity analysis.
13  
The information on all three determinants (or their components) comes from the 
Amadeus database.  
Further, thanks to their experience of dealing with foreign buyers and the ability 
to adjust to international standards, exporters may find it easier than other firms to do 
business with foreign affiliates. To account for the possibility, we control for the 
exporting status of the firm. The information on the exporting status comes from the 
survey. The exporter dummy (Exporterit) takes on the value of one if firm i was an 
exporter at the time of the survey. The value of one is assigned to all years starting with 
the year reported in the survey as the time of the first-time entry into foreign markets 
until the last year of our panel. The dummy takes on the value of zero in all other cases. 
Additionally the model includes industry fixed effects defined at the two-digit 
NACE level as well as year fixed effects. The unbalanced sample used in the regression 
covers the period 1993-2000, though 1993 drops out as all the right hand side variables 
enter lagged one period. 
The probit results, reported in the top panel of Table 7, suggest that the MNC 
supplier status is positively correlated with the lagged productivity, firm size, cash ratio 
and the exporting status. All of these variables are statistically significant both when 
entered together or in various combinations. 
                                                 
13 Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009) find that, unlike other Czech firms, MNC suppliers are not credit 
constrained. They attribute this finding to self-selection of non-constrained firms into becoming MNC 
suppliers.   14
A shortcoming of the above model is that we cannot control for the lagged 
supplier status.
14 Therefore, in the middle panel of Table 7 we present the estimation 
results of a linear probability model. As before, we find that the lagged productivity is a 
strong predictor of the firm being an MNC supplier. The coefficient on this variable is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all specifications. In contrast 
to the earlier findings, once we control for the lagged supplying status (which itself is 
positive and statistically significant) the other explanatory variables are no longer 
significant.
15,16 
In the bottom panel of Table 7, we present the results from a linear probability 
model explaining the decision to start supplying MNCs (rather than being an MNC 
supplier in given time period, as in the other two panels). This means that we drop from 
the sample suppliers observed in their second (or later) year of supplying MNCs. The 
coefficient on the TFP is positive and statistically significant at the 5 percent level in all 
specifications, suggesting that better performers are more likely to become MNC 
suppliers.  
In sum, the results emerging from all three types of estimation point into the same 
direction: more productive firms are more likely to supply MNCs. This means that if we 
are interested in searching for the evidence of learning from the supplying relationships 
with MNCs, we need to control for the selection issue. This is the task to which we turn 
next. 
 
Examining learning from supplying relationships with MNCs 
The results we have discussed so far suggest that suppliers are different from non-
suppliers. But were suppliers more productive to begin with, or did they improve their 
performance once they started supplying MNCs? To shed some light on this issue we 
                                                 
14 Given how the Supplierit variable is defined, its lag is a perfect predictor of the current supplying status 
and hence it cannot be included in the estimation. 
15 The estimation of linear probability models is based on a slightly higher number of observations than 
probit as, due to the inclusion of industry fixed effects, industries with no suppliers drop out from the probit 
estimation. 
16 We also experimented with a specification including firm fixed effects (instead of industry fixed effects). 
The short span of our data set (on average we have 4.5 observations per firm) meant that the coefficients of 
interest were not precisely estimated. The coefficient on the lagged productivity was slightly smaller (0.02) 
and statistically significant at the 12-13 percent level.   15
employ the instrumental variable approach. In the first stage, we regress the supplier 
status on a set of instruments and year fixed effects. In the second stage, we regress the 
firm’s TFP on the lagged (instrumented) supplier status and year fixed effects.  
The first set of instruments is industry-year specific. As it is likely that proximity 
to MNCs facilitates business relationships, our set of instruments includes proxies for the 
presence of multinationals in the same industry as well as in downstream industries. The 
proxy for the presence of MNCs in the same sector is defined as the share of the sector 
output produced by foreign firms. More specifically, it is calculated by weighting the 
output of each firm f in sector j  (Yft) by the share of the firm f’’s equity owned by 
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That is we use the proportion of sector j’s output supplied to a downstream sector k 
calculated based on the 1999 input-output matrix of the Czech Republic (jk) to weight 
the MNC presence in each downstream sector k. As the formula indicates, inputs supplied 
within the sector are not included. Thus the greater the foreign presence in sectors 
supplied by industry j and the larger the share of output supplied to industries with a 
multinational presence, the higher the value of the variable.
17 The above calculations are 
based on all firms included in the Amadeus database rather than just firms included in our 
sample. 
                                                 
17 To illustrate the meaning of the variable, suppose that the sugar industry sells half of its output to jam 
producers and half to chocolate producers. If no multinationals are producing jam but half of all chocolate 
production comes from foreign affiliates, Potential MNC customersjt will be calculated as follows: ½*0 + 
½*½ = ¼.     16
The next two instruments reflect the Czech Republic’s trade policy. It is plausible 
that if imports in a given sector are subject to tariffs, foreign affiliates may be more 
inclined to source inputs locally.
18 Thus tariff applied on sector j’s imports from the 
European Union will be used as an instrument. As tariff level may also affect the level of 
competition in the sector and hence firm productivity (though Arnold et al. (2007) report 
that this is not the case in the Czech Republic), we will use tariffs lagged two periods.  
Further, local producers may not be able to supply high quality intermediates 
unless they have access to imported raw materials (or may not be able to supply 
competitively priced intermediates if raw materials they use are subject to high tariffs). 
To take this possibility into account we will calculate the average tariff on inputs, where 
jt j jkTariff   
k   if k  jt inputs on    Tariff   
Javorcik and Spatareanu (2009) found that absence of liquidity constraints was an 
important determinant of which Czech firms were able to supply multinationals. 
Therefore, our next instrument takes into account: (i) progress in banking sector reform in 
the Czech Republic as captured by an index compiled by the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and reported in their annual publication Transition 
Report; (ii) reliance of sector j on the financial sector, as reflected in the Czech input-
output matrix; and (iii) the firm’s liquidity ratio defined as (current assets - current 
liabilities) / total assets. Our instrument is an interaction of the three components. The 
intuition behind it is the following: the reform of the banking sectors is likely to have an 
impact on firms’ access to credit with firms in sectors relying more heavily on external 
financing being more affected. Similarly, the extent to which firms are affected may 
depend on their liquidity. All the components of the instrument are lagged two periods.  
Our second set of instruments is firm specific and time varying. To address the 
issue of credit constraints just mentioned, we use a firm’s liquidity ratio, leverage ratio 
and cash ratio. The leverage ratio is defined as the ratio of current liabilities to current 
assets. Both components come from the Amadeus database. The cash ratio is defined, as 
discussed before, as cash to current liabilities. 
                                                 
18 Recall that 44 percent of multinationals cited import duties as a reason for why they choose to purchase 
inputs in the Czech Republic.   17
Several other instruments are based on the survey information. They include a 
dummy for the firm manager having foreign work experience and dummy for the firm 
having an ISO certification. It is likely that firms whose managers have foreign work 
experience are better positioned to obtain contracts from multinationals. Similarly, as 
indicated by the survey evidence discussed earlier, an ISO certification seems to play an 
important role in the multinationals’ decision to choose a local supplier. Finally, our set 
of instruments also includes the second lag of a supplier status and the second lag of the 
exporting dummy. The instruments are used in various interactions. 
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 8. The number of observations 
in the IV regressions (based, as before, on an unbalanced panel) is smaller than in the 
previous specifications. This is for two reasons. First, two years of data are lost because 
the instruments are based on second lags. Second, information on some of the variables 
used as instruments is not available for all firms and years. 
While these results should be treated with caution because of the small number of 
observations, they are nevertheless informative. The Hansen test for overidentification 
restrictions shows that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at conventional significance 
levels and thus the test does not cast doubt on the validity of our instruments. The F-tests 
and Shea R
2 suggest that our instruments are good predictors of the supplying status.   
We start our discussion of the IV results with the first stage. We find that firms 
with a higher leverage ratio are less likely to supply MNCs. The same is true of firms 
operating in sectors facing high input tariffs. The likelihood of supplying MNCs is also 
lower in sectors with a large foreign presence, possibly because foreign affiliates may be 
able to buy intermediates from other multinationals. The second lag of the exporting 
status, as well as the second lag of the supplying status interacted with other variables, 
also appear to be statistically significant. 
In all specifications, the supplier indicator is positive and statistically significant, 
which is suggestive of Czech suppliers learning from their relationships with 
multinational customers. The magnitude of the coefficient is meaningful: 6 of 8 
specifications suggest that MNC suppliers are 12-15 percent more productive than other 
firms. This is in line with the 14 percent premium produced by the OLS estimates 
reported in Table 6.   18
In summary, the results suggest that suppliers are different from non-suppliers in 
terms of productivity levels even after taking into account the self-selection of better 
performers into supplying MNCs. This observation is suggestive of suppliers learning 
form their interactions with multinational customers. It is consistent with the anecdotal 
evidence, observations emerging from the survey data discussed earlier and the 
econometric studies studying spillovers through vertical relationships using proxies built 
using information from input-output matrices. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
Building on the existing evidence demonstrating a positive correlation between 
the presence of multinationals in downstream industries and the productivity of domestic 
firms in the supplying (upstream) sectors, this study aims to shed more light on the 
mechanisms through which vertical spillovers from FDI may be taking place.   
We employ a unique data set which allows us to identify local firms supplying 
multinationals operating in the Czech Republic to ask whether best firms self-select into 
becoming suppliers or whether suppliers learn from their interactions with MNCs.  The 
results can be summarized as follows. First, we demonstrate that MNC suppliers different 
from other firms in terms of various characteristics (productivity, size, capital-intensity, 
wages). Second, we find that better performing firms are more likely to become MNC 
suppliers. Third, taking into account the selection issue, we find evidence suggestive of 
Czech suppliers learning from their relationships with multinationals. 
As our analysis is based on a relatively small sample, further work is needed to 
understand the mechanisms through which FDI affects domestic firms. 
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No. of firms becoming MNC suppliers Net FDI inflows (mn US$)
 
Source: FIAS survey for the number of suppliers, IMF International Financial 
Statistics for FDI inflows. 
Notes:  Figures on FDI inflows are not available for 1990-92 as during this 
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Table 1. Survey Respondents vs. Firms which Declined to Be Interviewed 
Variable  
Mean   Mean  
t-stat   p-value 
Respondent Non-Respondent 
        
Total Assets (th)  265000  278000  0.231  0.817 
Fixed Assets (th)  142000  126000  0.453  0.651 
Value Added (th)  71800  55600  1.490  0.137 
Sales (th)  263000  264000  0.022  0.982 
Employment 242  196  2.003  0.045 




Table 2. Distribution of Suppliers and Non-Suppliers across Sectors    
 NACE  
No. of firms 
Non-
suppliers  Suppliers   Total 
     
Manufacture of fabricated metal products except machinery   15  8  23 
Manufacture of food products and beverages  7  7  14 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media  4  3  7 
Manufacture of basic metals  5  3  8 
Manufacture of textiles  2  2  4 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood except furniture  8  2  10 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products  3  4  7 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products  4  4  8 
Manufacture of other non-metallic  mineral  products  2 2 4 
Other mining and quarrying  0  1  1 
Tanning and dressing of leather; manuf. of luggage and footwear  0  1  1 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment  9  2  11 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments  3  1  4 
Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing for fur  2  0  2 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus  2  0  2 
Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c.  2  0  2 
     
Total 68  40  108 
n.e.c. denotes ‘not elsewhere classified’. 
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Table 3. Distribution of MNC Suppliers       








in the CR 
North 
America  Russia/CIS
No of MNCs reporting each type of suppliers  107 85 56 18 9 
       
MNC in the 25th percentile  5  2  2  1  1 
median  MNC  (50th  percentile)  10 5 4 1  2 
MNC in the 75th percentile  30  10  10  4  2 







Table 4.  Assistance Received from MNC Customers   
 
No. of firms reporting receiving 
assistance  
 
(out of 25 companies reporting 
assistance)  of which assistance for a fee 
advance payment and financing  14  2 
leasing/lending of machinery  7  2 
employee training  7  1 
quality control  5  1 
business strategy  5  0 
supplying inputs  2  1 
production technology  3  1 
organization of production lines  3  1 
finding export markets  3  1 
obtaining license for a new technology  2  1 
financial planning  2  0 
maintenance of machinery  2  1 
inventory management  1  0 
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Table 5. Summary Statistics 
   Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. 
Non-Suppliers      
ln TFP  326  11.403  0.391 
Value added (th)  326  35600  24800 
Sales (th)  326  126000  131000 
Fixed Assets (th)  326  48100  57500 
No. of employees  326  178  125 
Investment (th)  326  753  14900 
Exporter 326  0.736  0.441 
ISO 293  0.601  0.491 
Manager with foreign experience  293  0.078  0.269 
Leverage ratio  293  0.970  4.414 
Liquidity ratio  293  0.167  0.221 
Cash ratio  326  0.336  0.537 
      
      
Suppliers      
ln TFP  160  11.531  0.338 
Value added (th)  160  41700  29400 
Sales (th)  160  156000  194000 
Fixed Assets (th)  160  60200  89500 
No. of employees  160  172  94 
Investment (th)  160  5364  24800 
Exporter 160  0.850  0.358 
ISO 152  0.605  0.490 
Manager with foreign experience  152  0.191  0.394 
Leverage ratio  152  0.728  0.616 
Liquidity ratio  152  0.181  0.259 
Cash ratio  160  0.529  1.135 
      
IVs      
Potential MNC customers  100  11.390  5.780 
MNCs in the same sector  100  18.960  14.310 
Tariff on inputs  100  2.830  3.180 
Banking reform * IO * liquidity ratio  91  0.699  0.734   25
 
 
Table 6. Supplier Premium   
  (a) (b) 
  (%)  with controls for firm size 
Total employment  12.8  - 
Sales  17.7 11.1 
Sales growth  n.s.  n.s. 
Capital per worker  16.6 18.6 
TFP  14.1 11.6 
Value added per worker  23.2 12.2 
Wages per worker  11.7 14.4 
(a) The premia are based on coefficients of the Supplier dummy in the following regressions: 
ln Xit = +  Supplierit + j  +t + it 
where j stands for two-digit industry and t for year fixed effects. 
(b) The premia are based on the following regression: 
ln Xit =  +  Supplierit +  ln Employmentit + j +t + it 
n.s. denotes a coefficient not statistically significant at the conventional significance levels.   26
Table 7. Predicting Supplier Status     
   Probit model: Predicting supplier status    
TFP (lag)  0.521***  0.454** 0.421**  0.407** 
 [0.194]  [0.194]  [0.196]  [0.195] 
Firm size (lag)  0.157*  0.158**  0.142* 
   [0.081]  [0.080]  [0.080] 
Cash/current liabilities (lag)  0.242***  0.227*** 
     [0.074]  [0.071] 
Exporter (lag)      0.541*** 
       [0.191] 
Intercept -0.093  -2.138 -1.794  -1.897 
 [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
No. of obs.  449  449  449  449 
Pseudo R
2 0.1  0.11  0.12  0.14 
   Linear probability model: Predicting supplier status  
TFP (lag)  0.033**  0.034** 0.034**  0.035** 
 [0.015]  [0.014]  [0.014]  [0.014] 
Firm size (lag)  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
   [0.008]  [0.008]  [0.008] 
Cash/current liabilities (lag)  -0.001  0 
     [0.006]  [0.006] 
Exporter (lag)      -0.022 
       [0.025] 
Supplier (lag)  0.960***  0.961***  0.961***  0.964*** 
 [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.012]  [0.013] 
Intercept -0.319**  -0.306  -0.306  -0.306 
 [0.161]  [0.231]  [0.234]  [0.236] 
No. of obs.  486  486  486  486 
R
2 0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
   Linear probability model: Predicting the decision to become a supplier 
TFP (lag)  0.044**  0.043** 0.042**  0.044** 
 [0.022]  [0.020]  [0.021]  [0.021] 
Firm size (lag)  0.003  0.005  0.005 
   [0.013]  [0.013]  [0.013] 
Cash/current liabilities (lag)  0.014  0.015 
     [0.030]  [0.030] 
Exporter (lag)      -0.031 
       [0.033] 
Intercept -0.492*  -0.534  -0.559  -0.58 
 [0.252]  [0.369]  [0.364]  [0.365] 
No. of obs.  338  338  338  338 
R2 0.06  0.06  0.06  0.06 
All specifications include industry and year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  The dependent variable in the top and the middle panel equals 
one if firm i is an MNC supplier at time t and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the bottom panel equals one if firm i 
becomes an MNC supplier at time t and equals zero if firm i does not supply MNCs at time t. The sample used in the bottom 
panel excludes suppliers observed in their second (or later) year of supplying MNCs.
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Table 8. Instrumental Variable Approach 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
   IV 
    SECOND STAGE 
Supplier (lag)   0.125*  0.125*  0.262* 0.210*  0.137* 0.144** 0.124*  0.154* 
   [0.073]  [0.073]  [0.155] [0.110]  [0.081] [0.073] [0.066] [0.092] 
Intercept   13.600*** 13.600*** 13.529*** 13.552*** 13.596*** 13.593*** 13.607*** 13.577*** 
   [0.071]  [0.071]  [0.096] [0.080]  [0.070] [0.067] [0.064] [0.077] 
    FIRST STAGE 
Leverage ratio (lag 2)    -0.001***         
  [0.000]         
Liquidity ratio (lag 2)      0.007        
      [0.065]        
Banking reform * IO * 
liquidity ratio (lag 2) 
    -0.070**       
    [0.031]       
Tariff on inputs       -0.024***       
       [0.006]       
Potential MNC customers (lag 
2) 
      -0.001  0.001     -0.002 
      [0.005]  [0.004]     [0.003] 
MNCs in the same sector (lag 
2) 
      -0.003  -0.001     -0.003** 
      [0.002]  [0.001]     [0.001] 
MNCs in the same sector (lag 
2) * Supplier (lag 2) 
        0.020***    
        [0.003]    
Manager with foreign 
experience * Supplier (lag 2) 
     0.645***  0.729***      0.344*** 
     [0.041]  [0.030]      [0.083] 
Tariff (lag 2)* Supplier (lag 2)           0.043***   
         [0.003]   
Potential MNC customers (lag 
2) * Supplier (lag 2) 
  0.055***  0.055***       0.059***   
  [0.004]  [0.004]       [0.003]   
ISO * Supplier (lag 2)    0.253***  0.253***      0.799***  0.506*** 0.115** 0.736*** 
  [0.053] [0.055]      [0.022] [0.047] [0.049] [0.033] 
Cash ratio (lag 2) * Supplier 
(lag 2) 
      0.201***  0.178***  0.130***    
      [0.033]  [0.019]  [0.023]    
Exporter (lag 2)       0.146***       0.082** 
       [0.049]       [0.040] 
Intercept   0.096*** 0.093*** 0.296***  0.311*** 0.145*** 0.116*** 0.069*** 0.192*** 
   [0.016]  [0.019] [0.050]  [0.065]  [0.053] [0.016] [0.013] [0.060] 
            
No. of obs.    314 314 318 322 374 374 371 322 
F-test    67.5 63.2 54.5 46.9  130.3  57.5  232.0  70.7 
    p-value    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Shea partial R2    0.72 0.72 0.17 0.27 0.53 0.63 0.78 0.48 
Hansen J statistic    1.33 0.30 3.26 3.09 4.21 0.77 0.28 3.01 
    p-value    0.52 0.86 0.35 0.38 0.24 0.68 0.87 0.56 
                           
All specifications include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 